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Abstract
Organizational support theory proposes that
employees develop global beliefs concerning the degree
to which an organization values their contributions and
cares about their well-being. These beliefs, known as
perceived organizational support (POS), are related to
a number of positive employee outcomes, including: job
satisfaction, work effort, performance, etc. Three
categories of POS antecedents have been recognized in
the literature: perceived supervisor support; fairness of
organizational procedures; and organizational rewards
and job conditions. In this paper, we explore these
antecedent categories in the gig-work context where
organizations replace human managers with
algorithmic management practices and data-driven
procedures. In doing so, we develop a new conceptual
model that centers on the role that a gig-organization’s
algorithm plays in engendering POS by promoting
perceptions of algorithmic fairness (PAF) and
perceptions of autonomy support (PAAS). Contributions
and future research avenues are discussed.

1. Introduction
The gig-economy is an emerging labor market in
which organizations engage independent workers to
complete short-term contracts known as “gigs”, by
connecting workers to customers via a platform-enabled
digital marketplace. Lauded as the future of work [1],
industry experts predict that by 2023 more than half of
the U.S. workforce will participate in the gig-economy,
at least occasionally [2]. While gig-organizations derive
many operational benefits such as agility and reduced
costs from their business model, given the size and
distributed nature of their workforces, they cannot rely
on the traditional means of supervision to coordinate
and control work [3]. Instead they rely on algorithmic
management, a managerial practice whereby human
managers are replaced by software algorithms that
oversee, control, and optimize the performance of
myriads of virtual workers at a large scale [4, 5, 6].
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In recent years, the societal and managerial
implications of algorithms have spawned much public
debate and drawn increasing attention from scholars [4,
5, 7]. With research into the impacts of algorithms on
human workers and work practices still in its nascent
stages, one area of study that remains underexplored is
the impact of algorithmic management on gig-workers’
perceptions of organizational support [4, 8]. Perceived
organizational support (POS) is the degree to which
employees believe that their “organization values their
contributions and cares about their well-being” [9, p.
698]. Importantly, perceptions of organizational support
among workers are shown to lead to increased job
satisfaction, commitment and loyalty, job performance,
organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), as well as
reduced turnover and employee deviance [9, 10, 11].
While the notion of POS may, at first thought, seem
irrelevant to the gig-work context given that
independent work is typically defined in part by its lack
of organizational support [8], and where workers are not
employees and have no official human supervisor, POS
has been found to apply in non-traditional work contexts
akin to gig-work like contract work [12]. Such research
has not only demonstrated that contingent workers can,
and do, experience POS, but that they form perceptions
of support from multiple organizational relationships,
thereby suggesting the existence of unique antecedents
for each relational source of POS [12].
Nevertheless, in spite of such emergent research,
research exploring POS in non-traditional relationships
is just beginning. Like many organizational behavior
theories, POS was developed in traditional management
contexts where human managers supervise and support
full-time employees, often by building close, trust-based
relationships [12]. Unsurprisingly, there is a gap in the
literature concerning how workers develop POS when
managed by a “faceless boss” and a set of organizational
policies enacted through codes [4, 8].
As the application of new information technologies
to organizational design continues to change the nature
of work [3, 13], there is a need to conceptualize new
POS antecedents for non-traditional work contexts [8,
10, 12]. Thus, the goal of our paper is to understand how
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do the impersonal, technology-mediated practices
inherent of algorithmic management impact workers’
perceptions of organizational support, and to explore
whether the lack of a human supervisor can be
compensated for by other POS antecedents. As the use
of algorithmic management reaches beyond the gigeconomy [3, 6, 8, 14, 15], closing this research gap
stands to offer theoretical and practical contributions to
the social and managerial study of algorithms – two
growing and critical areas of research [5, 6, 16].
Our paper is structured accordingly. We first
introduce our research context, including boundary
conditions. Next, we review the POS literature including
key antecedents, and the importance of POS in the
context of the gig-economy. We then introduce our
model and theoretical development. We conclude by
discussing our research contributions and future work.

2. Algorithmic Management & Gig-Work
The term algorithmic management was initially
coined by Lee et al. [4] in reference to software
algorithms and surrounding institutional devices (e.g.,
platforms) that assume managerial functions.
Considered one of the core innovations enabling the
platform-based business models of the gig-economy,
algorithmic management has allowed gig-organizations
to manage myriads of distributed laborers in an efficient
(low-cost and real-time) manner [4, 5, 6, 16, 17]. In the
gig-economy, algorithms are typically responsible for
matching workers with customers, assigning work,
monitoring and evaluating work performance, as well as
implementing a range of HR decisions [4, 6, 18].
Insofar as algorithmic management is most often
adopted in freelancing or quasi-employment contexts on
digital labor platforms [5], we delineate the scope of this
paper to the study of gig-workers participating on
platforms that operate as digital marketplaces for
alternative work where the services exchanged on the
platform are remunerated, labor-intensive (e.g., Uber)
rather than capital-intensive (e.g. Airbnb), and can be
fulfilled either virtually via a crowdsourcing platform
business model (e.g., MTurk, Upwork) [13, 19] or
physically via an on-demand platform business model
(e.g., Uber) [3, 4, 8].
Within these boundaries, we further recognize that
intermediary digital labor platforms can be
conceptualized as a set of technological affordances
where there is a trade-off between the agency that
platform features (e.g., algorithms) take in conducting
transactions and the amount left to participants [13, 18].
Using this distinction, digital labor platforms can be
classified along a continuum ranging from highly
centralized models (which automate and take control of

exchanges) to decentralized platforms (which rely on
the discretion, and thus autonomy, of participants to
conduct exchanges). Since algorithmic management
was initially developed to optimize the convenience,
speed, and seamlessness of undifferentiated, low-skill
on-demand service exchanges (e.g., Uber) [4, 6, 15], we
restrict our theory-building to workers participating on
such highly centralized digital labor platforms. Notably,
while freelancers marketing higher-skill services on
“digital platforms with substantial autonomy may not
expect a [platform-provider] to care about their wellbeing”, low-skill workers who are more actively
managed by a platform firm tend to perceive themselves
as employees [8, p. 193]. By consequence, perceptions
of organizational support could have important
consequences for gig-workers performing low-skill
work on highly centralized platforms [8].
Insofar as digital labor marketplaces typically
involve three parties (clients, gig-workers, and the
platform provider), the gig-work relationship bears
conceptual similarities with traditional contract work
[5]. Given findings that contract workers can form
perceptions of organizational support from their staffing
agency, the client organization, or both [12], we
recognize that gig-workers could form perceptions of
support from interactions with clients [19]. However,
considering that the interactions low-skill gig-workers
have with clients are substantially more fleeting than
traditional contract workers [5, 8, 12], we limit our focus
to POS deriving from the platform provider. Notably,
Kuhn & Maleki [8] suggested that where the nature of a
platform precludes workers from forming long-term
relationships with clients, the quality of the relationship
between the platform firm and gig-worker is likely
paramount. Thus, focusing on platform-firm induced
POS is conceptually and contextually important.

3. Perceived Organizational Support
The concept of POS derives from Organizational
Support Theory (OST) which explains employeremployee relationships through the lens of social
exchange theory [9]. Specifically, “OST invokes social
exchange theory [by conceptualizing employment] as
the trade of effort and loyalty by the employee for
tangible benefits and social resources from the
organization” [10, p. 1857]. Within this frame, OST
assumes that workers ascertain an organization’s
readiness to reward their work efforts and to meet their
socioemotional needs by developing a set of global
beliefs concerning an organization’s support.
Perceptions of organizational support allow employees
to gauge their valuation by the organization which can
range from a perception that the “organization regards
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them very positively” to the perception that the
organization disdains them and wishes “to get rid of
them given the first opportunity” [20, p. 4].
According to OST, POS should stimulate the norm
of reciprocity such that employees treated favorably will
care about an organization’s well-being and feel an
obligation to help the organization reach its objectives,
as well as feel an expectation that their increased
performance will be recognized and rewarded. As a
result, both parties benefit: employees experience
heightened positive mood and job satisfaction, while
organizations reap the benefits of increased
commitment, work-effort, and performance [9, 10].

3.1. Antecedents of POS
In their 2002 meta-analysis of 70 studies, Rhoades
& Eisenberger [9] identified three major categories of
POS antecedents, namely: perceived supervisor support
(PSS); fairness of organizational procedures; and
organizational rewards and job conditions. More
recently, the importance of these antecedents was reconfirmed by Kurtessis et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis of
558 studies, which subsumed these categories into a set
of more broadly defined categories of POS antecedents
[10]. For the sake of parsimony, we focus our theoretical
development on Rhoades & Eisenberger’s categories.
This decision is justified by the fact that both PSS and
fairness have been found to have the largest and most
significant effects on POS in both meta-analyses.
We now briefly elaborate these antecedents to
provide a conceptual understanding of their connections
to POS and their underlying processes in traditional
management contexts. Prior to doing so, it is important
to note that in order to positively impact POS, the
favorable treatment of workers through these
antecedents must be perceived as discretionary (e.g.,
under the control of the organization), as opposed to
compulsory practices imposed by external constraints
(e.g., government regulations, public pressure, or a tight
job market) [9, 10, 20]. Specifically, when the favorable
treatment of workers is considered voluntary on the part
of the organization, it signals that the motives behind
such treatment are concerned with employees’ welfare,
and therefore they positively impact POS [20].
3.1.1. Perceived supervisor support (PSS). In the
same way that employees develop global beliefs
concerning their valuation by the organization, they also
form similar views concerning the degree to which other
organizational members value their contributions and
care about their well-being [9]. The favorable treatment
of employees by organizational members is linked to
POS because of employees’ tendency to personify the
organization and to “attribute role-related actions taken

by members of the organization to the organization
itself” [10, p. 1861]. Thus, since supervisors act as
agents of the organization, and have direct ties to upper
management, employees associate supervisor support
with organizational support [9].
Although both perceived co-worker support and
team support have been positively related to POS,
perceived supervisor support (the extent to which
employees believe that their supervisor values their
contributions, offers assistance, and cares about their
well-being) has a significantly stronger effect on POS
than support from other members [10]. The reason for
this difference is because supervisors more closely
embody the organization and are seen as acting on its
behalf through their responsibility for directing and
evaluating sub-ordinates’ performance [10]. Moreover,
supervisors and other organizational leaders play a key
role in providing rewards and allocating resources to
employees, and thus are considered to be a greater
source of organizational support than coworkers [10].
3.1.2. Fairness of organizational procedures. The
concept of fairness originates from the Theory of
Organizational Justice [11]. Procedural justice concerns
the fairness of the approaches used to determine how
resources such as pay, promotions, and job assignments
are distributed. Given that organizational procedures are
considered by employees to be highly discretionary as
well as essential to their long-term interests and wellbeing, procedural fairness has been found to be one of
the strongest drivers of POS [9, 10].
Notably, procedural justice has been conceptualized
as having both structural and social aspects [9].
Specifically, structural aspects are viewed as concerning
the formal rules and policies pertaining to decisions that
impact employees, including: “adequate notice before
decisions are implemented, the receipt of accurate
information, and voice (i.e., employee input in the
decision process)” [9, pp. 700-701]. Social aspects are
viewed as involving the quality of interpersonal
treatment in the resource allocation process, including:
“treating employees with dignity and respect, providing
employees with opportunities for active involvement in
the development and application of organizational
procedures, and providing employees with information
concerning how outcomes are determined” [ibid.].
Given these two conceptualizations, procedural
justice can be both a function of an organization, such
as through a formalized decision-making system, or a
function of a decision-making agent such as a manager
that involves an employee in decisions [21].
Nonetheless, regardless of the source, repeated episodes
of intentional fairness in resource distribution are shown
to have a strong cumulative effect on POS by signaling
concern for employees’ welfare [9].
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3.1.3. Organizational rewards and job conditions.
Human resource (HR) practices that recognize
employees’ contributions, as well as various work-role
characteristics and job conditions, have long-been
linked to POS. A wide array of HR practices and job
conditions have been explored in relation to POS,
including, but not limited to: rewards, benefits, job
security, autonomy, flexible work-practices, as well as
training and developmental opportunities [9, 10, 12].
It is important to note that of the three categories of
antecedents, organizational rewards and job conditions
have a weaker impact than PSS and fairness since they
tend to be attributed to external pressures rather than to
discretionary behavior [9]. Nevertheless, various HR
practices, such as rewards and working conditions are
linked to POS since employees consider such factors to
be directly tied to the enhancement of their welfare.
Specifically, by communicating a positive valuation of
employees’ contributions, favorable opportunities for
rewards (e.g., recognition, pay, etc.) positively impact
workers’ perceptions of organizational support [9, 10].
Similarly, by providing workers with assurance that
the organization wishes to maintain their future
membership, both job security as well as training and
development opportunities are positively linked to POS.
Conversely, organizational size is negatively related to
POS; specifically, individuals feel less valued in large
organizations where formalized policies and procedures
may reduce flexibility in dealing with employees’
individual needs. In terms of effect size, both job
security and autonomy have been found to have the
strongest relationships with POS, while training and
organizational size have been shown to have moderate
relationships [9, 10].

3.2. POS and the gig-economy
Extensive research, including two meta-analyses
(e.g., 12, 13), suggests that gig-organizations can
address two of their key HR management challenges by
engendering POS among gig-workers. Firstly, gigorganizations face high turnover rates [3]. Given that
POS has been related to reduced voluntary turnover and
turnover intentions [9, 10], gig-organizations that are
perceived to care about workers’ well-being should be
better positioned to address the challenges of retaining
independent workers. In point of fact, in discussing POS
and PSS, Kuhn & Maleki reported that “workers who
quit platforms often cite a lack of support” [8, p. 193].
Secondly, gig-organizations face the challenge of
managing a large workforce of independent gig-workers
that are often engaged in client-facing roles, and where
there is a high risk for opportunistic behavior [3]. As an
example, in a bid to increase earnings per ride, Uber
drivers were found to be gaming Uber’s dynamic

pricing model by simultaneously logging off the app to
deceptively activate surge pricing [17]. Where POS has
not only been positively linked to performance, but also
to organizational identification and organizational
citizenship behavior, the theory of social exchange
contends that gig-organizations that are perceived to
care about workers’ well-being are better positioned to
manage workers’ performance and to mitigate the risks
of deviant behavior [9, 10, 11, 12].
While the benefits of engendering POS among gigworkers are clear, traditional paths to POS can be
disrupted in the context of platform work. For instance,
job conditions critical to the formation of POS such as
job security and organizational size are hindered in the
context of algorithmically-managed platform work.
Specifically, platform work is characterized by low jobsecurity [13], a lack of benefits [8], threats to autonomy
[3, 5, 6], as well as a large and boundless organizational
size [4, 5], all of which can harm POS.
The use of algorithmic management is also expected
to disrupt the POS antecedents of supervisor support and
procedural fairness. Insofar as algorithmic management
systems necessitate the minimization of human
intervention to benefit from algorithmic-efficiencies,
algorithmic management marks a radical departure from
earlier managerial logic, which relied heavily on human
supervisors to direct work [5, 6, 15]. In algorithmically
managed contexts, most managerial and decisionmaking processes are reduced into a set of opaque
algorithmic processes that are both complex and
inaccessible to the typical worker [1, 6, 8]. Thus, given
the scarcity of human intervention and considering that
workers’ subjective interpretations of procedural justice
play a key role in forming perceptions of organizational
support, both antecedents of supervisor support and
procedural justice will be disrupted by algorithmic
management [8]. As such, a new theory of POS is
required for algorithmically-managed gig-work.

4. Theoretical Development
We now develop our conceptual model exploring the
impact of algorithmic management on POS. To do so,
we rely on Möhlmann & Zalmanson’s [5]
conceptualization of algorithmic management which
defines the concept across five dimensions: (1) the
constant tracking of workers’ behavior; (2) constant
performance
evaluation;
(3)
the
automatic
implementation of decisions; (4) workers’ interaction
with a “system”; and (5) (low) transparency. We adopt
Möhlmann & Zalmanson’s conceptualization as it is the
first detailed, IS-specific research perspective of the
phenomenon. Notably, their model is aligned with Lee
et al.’s [4] pioneering exploration of the phenomenon,
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and recent high-level definitions of algorithmic
management and its key features (e.g., [15, 22]).
The foundation of our model (Figure 1) hinges on the
role that a gig-organization’s algorithm plays in
engendering POS by promoting perceptions of fairness
and perceptions of autonomy support. Our theoretical
development is structured as follows. First, we propose
the perception of algorithms as ‘social agents’ and
introduce two algorithmic perceptions as antecedents of
POS. After, we explore these two antecedents in depth
to understand how they are impacted by Möhlmann &
Zalmanson’s dimensions of algorithmic management.

Figure 1: Conceptual Model

4.1. Algorithms as Social Agents
Insofar as gig-workers lack an official human
supervisor and are often managed through customer
service representatives over email correspondences or
chatbots [5, 10], PSS is likely to be low [10]. Yet when
supervisors are replaced by algorithms, we suggest that
key POS antecedents are embodied within the algorithm
itself such that it will be considered as more than just a
tool or set of rules, but also as a social actor – an
algorithmic ‘manager’ per se. To understand this
conceptualization, we defer to a key predecessor of the
contemporary literature on algorithmic perceptions.
Dating back nearly 20 years, scholars in the fields of
human-computer-interaction (HCI) and social factors,
studied how people perceive computers [14]. Within
this stream of work, the Computers Are Social Actors
(CASA) paradigm originated with the publication of
Nass & Moon’s [23] article which demonstrated that
people respond to computers according to “sociopsychological principles similar to those that regulate
human-to-human interaction” [14, p. 3]. Drawing on the
human personality psychology literature, Nass & Moon
argued that the tendency for individuals to interact with
computers as if they were social agents, and not just
tools, was due to individuals mindlessly applying social
rules and expectations to computers [23].
Mindless behavior is the result of conscious attention
to a subset of contextual cues, where such “cues trigger
various scripts, labels, and expectations, [that] in turn
focus attention on certain information while diverting

attention away from other information” [23, p. 83].
Thus, to elicit mindless social responses in a computerhuman context, a person must be presented with an
object that has sufficient humanlike cues to lead the
person to categorize it as worthy of social responses
while ignoring the asocial nature of the computer [23].
Nass & Moon suggested three cues that might
encourage the categorization of computers as social
actors, namely: (1) words for output; (2) interactivity or
responses based on multiple prior inputs; and (3) the
filling of roles traditionally filled by humans.
Arguably, all of these cues are present in the context
of algorithmic management where software algorithms
operating on platforms assume managerial functions,
and gig-workers remain connected to the digital labor
platform through a digital device. Specifically, by virtue
of definition, managerial algorithms fill roles
traditionally assigned to humans. Moreover, the
algorithms powering the platforms, which serve as the
interface between the gig-worker and algorithm, use
words for output, and exhibit high interactivity and
responses based on personalized information which is
supplied and gathered via the digital device that
connects a worker to the platform [4, 5, 15]. Thus, we
argue that the algorithms operating on digital labor
platforms provide sufficient bases for workers to cue
“humanness,” and to encourage social responses via the
treatment of computers as social actors.
4.1.1. Perceived Algorithmic Fairness. Perceptions of
organizational support are driven by employees’
tendencies to assign humanlike characteristics to
organizations and to attribute the actions taken by its
agents (e.g., managers) as indications of the
organization’s intent towards them. This process of
personification is supported by “the organization’s
legal, moral, and financial responsibility for the actions
of its agents; by organizational policies, norms, and
culture that provide continuity and prescribe role
behaviors; and by the power the organization’s agents
exert over individual employees” [9, p. 698].
Considering that algorithms implemented in
management contexts operate on, and enact, a set of
previously developed rules and instructions that embody
an organization’s policies and procedures, we suggest
that managerial algorithms can be considered both as
embodiments of procedural justice, and as
organizational agents demonstrating fairness (or
unfairness) in their decision-making processes. This
proposition is supported by the CASA literature [23],
and the notion that procedural justice can be a function
of an organization, such as its formal decision-making
system, or a function of a decision-making agent [21].
Importantly, recent work suggests that individuals
do attribute managerial algorithms to the organizations
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that chose them [14]. This is aligned with the fact that
as an intermediary between workers and clients, the
platform owner is the only party with full access to and
control over the platform’s data, processes, and rules
[3]. As such, a gig-organization’s algorithm(s) “can be
understood as an automated manifestation of the
interests of the platform organizer” [6, p. 9]. We
therefore introduce the concept of Perceived
Algorithmic Fairness (PAF) which we define as a
platform-worker’s perception concerning the fairness of
the algorithmic approaches applied by a digital labor
platform to determine how resources are distributed.
Thus, we propose:
P1: Perceived algorithmic fairness will be positively
related to POS.
4.1.2. Perceived Algorithmic Autonomy Support.
While many job conditions critical to the formation of
POS are hindered in algorithmically-managed contexts
we propose that job autonomy will remain a key
determinant of POS for platform workers. Specifically,
the need for autonomy has been cited extensively by
independent gig-workers as a leading driver for
participation in the gig-economy [1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 17, 13].
Generally speaking, autonomy refers to an
individual’s inherent desire to experience a sense of
choice, volition, and psychological freedom when
engaging in an activity [3], while job autonomy refers to
the freedom an individual has in carrying out their work
including planning, decision-making, and choosing
when and how to perform the task [9, 13]. Within the
motivation literature, autonomy is considered a basic
need among individuals such that its satisfaction
promotes worker well-being [24]. Similarly, within the
job-design literature, autonomy has been emphasized as
an important aspect of job-design that makes jobs more
satisfying, thereby promoting employee well-being [3].
Importantly, both the technical aspects of one’s work
(e.g., job-design) as well as the general social context in
which the work is done can (e.g., managers’ treatment
of employees) can promote workers’ autonomy [3, 24].
In the context of the gig-economy, algorithms
typically assume control and responsibility for matching
of workers with customers, assigning work, and
evaluating workers’ performance [4, 6, 15]. In this
frame, a gig-worker’s autonomy is defined in terms of
their ability to self-schedule when they work, their right
to reject or accept gigs and, depending on the platform,
their ability to choose the methods and processes they
use to conduct their work [1, 3, 6, 8]. Importantly, recent
research has proposed that the operational choices
embedded within a platform’s architecture will
implicitly shape a platform workers’ autonomy such that
platforms can be conceptualized and defined as either
autonomy supportive or non-supportive [3, 8]. We thus

introduce the concept of perceived algorithmic
autonomy support (PAAS), which we define as the
degree to which a platform-worker perceives that an
algorithmically-managed digital labor platform is
autonomy supportive.
Notably, the promise of freedom and autonomy (e.g.,
be your own boss) is a well-recognized cornerstone of
the gig-economy’s recruitment tactics. In this respect,
platforms that fail to support workers’ autonomy may
represent a breach in psychological contract [12]. The
concept of “psychological contract reflects employees’
beliefs about their social exchange relationships with
their organization, mutual obligations, and the extent to
which the obligations are fulfilled” [10, p. 10]. Per
Kurtessis et al. [10], obligations can be based on explicit
organizational promises or implicit expectations held by
employees. Since organizational promises are most
often viewed as voluntary, contract breach has a strong
negative relationship with POS [10]. Thus, platforms
that thwart workers’ autonomy should be negatively
related to POS. Conversely, by demonstrating the
organization’s trust in workers’ judgment and skills to
decide wisely how to do their job, platforms that support
workers’ autonomy should strengthen POS [9, 10].
Moreover, in doing so, platforms that support workers’
autonomy also demonstrate organizational concern for
workers’ well-being [3, 24] and fulfillment of the
psychological contract [10]. Thus, we propose that:
P2: Perceived algorithmic autonomy support will be
positively related to POS.

4.2. Perceived Algorithmic Autonomy Support
Given that companies that promote workers’
autonomy through the right to self-schedule and the
right to accept or decline work-orders tend to experience
reduced profit margins, as well as coverage issues
leading to client dissatisfaction, gig-organizations are
known to counter workers’ autonomy through “softer”
and less visible forms of control [1]. A well-recognized
phenomenon of the gig-economy, the concept of ‘soft
control’ [17] is enabled by three features of algorithmic
management: constant tracking; constant evaluation,
and low transparency or high opacity [1, 5, 17, 18].
4.2.1. Constant tracking and evaluation. Algorithmic
management is characterized by the constant tracking of
individual workers’ behaviors through a digital device
that connects the worker to the platform [4, 5]. Such
tracking can take various forms ranging from the
tracking of Uber drivers’ locations and driving patterns
(e.g., acceleration and breaking) to platform-based
surveillance software such as Work Diary used by
Upwork to track workers’ keystrokes and take
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screenshots of their work [3, 5, 8]. In turn, the tracked
data is used to evaluate workers’ performance [4, 5, 17]
whereby an algorithm will automatically reward or
punish workers for achieving or failing to maintain
benchmark levels of key performance indicators [1, 3,
4, 5]. Through algorithmic tracking and evaluations,
workers’ autonomy can be significantly curtailed;
specifically, both the surveillance of workers as well as
evaluations (accompanied by rewards or punishments)
have been shown to threaten perceptions of autonomy
and to foster feelings of control by impeding workers’
freedom to govern and control their behavior [3, 1, 6, 8].
Thus, we propose that:
P3: The constant tracking of gig-workers’ behaviors
(P3a) and the constant evaluation of their performance
(P3b) will be negatively related to perceived
algorithmic autonomy support.
4.2.2. Algorithmic transparency. The term
‘algorithmic transparency’ was coined by Diakopoulos
& Koliska [25] in reference to the disclosure of the
factors that influence the decisions made by algorithms
to ensure the monitoring, checking, criticism, and/or
intervention by those who use, regulate, and are
impacted by such algorithms. Per Möhlmann &
Zalmanson
[5],
algorithmic
management
is
characterized by low levels of transparency, a situation
known as algorithmic opacity [25, 26]. Understandably,
algorithmic opacity is often a strategic decision taken by
the platform owner to avoid disclosing proprietary
information and to deter workers from ‘gaming the
system’ [4, 5, 6, 26]. Most often, it is leveraged by
platform owners to intentionally generate information
asymmetries aimed at controlling workers’ decisionmaking autonomy [1, 6, 17, 25, 26].
When algorithms lack transparency, the decisions
generated by an algorithm can seem “impenetrable,
erratic, and unpredictable” [6, p. 2] leaving workers
frustrated with the opacity of the decision-making
system, and leading to reductions in workers’ autonomy
[3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 27]. For instance, Shapiro [1] found
that updates to the worker-facing application that
limited the information an algorithm provided the
worker, as well as unannounced changes to the
algorithms’ payment system, substantially curtailed
workers’ decision-making capacities with respect to
which jobs to accept or decline. Conversely, when
algorithms are transparent, workers are able to gain a
basic familiarity with the platform’s functions [6] and,
by extension, regain their sense of autonomy through
their ability to navigate and control various aspects of
their work, and to take informed decisions [4, 5, 6].
Notably, transparency is also viewed as a way to
discern the truth and motives behind people’s actions [6,
25]. Given that algorithmic transparency bolsters

workers’ decision-making capacities, it is likely to be
perceived by workers as an indication of the
organization’s trust in their abilities to decide wisely
how to do their job, and thereby a support of their
autonomy. Thus, we propose that:
P4: Algorithmic transparency will be positively related
to perceived algorithmic autonomy support.

4.3. Perceived Algorithmic Fairness
Digital labor platforms rely heavily on minimizing
human intervention to ensure flexibility, agility, and
efficiency through a process of scaling and automation
[5, 6, 14, 18]. As a result, algorithmic working
environments are characterized by the automatic
implementation of decisions where “algorithms do
things” and feelings of working with a “system” rather
than humans [5, 16, 17]. Justifiably, the impacts of
algorithms as both decision-makers and enactors on
workers’ perceptions of fairness are significant,
particularly in the characteristically low transparency
context of algorithmic management [5, 14].
4.3.1. Algorithmic transparency. Generally speaking,
procedural fairness is determined by whether the
decision-making process is: based on accurate
information; objective; transparent; consistently
applied; and includes safeguards, such as an appeal
process to correct flawed or inaccurate decisions [8, 9,
10, 21]. Given that algorithmic decision-makers lack
both agency and emotion and, by definition, follow the
same set of procedures every time, it has been suggested
that algorithms have the potential to reduce bias and
increase consistency in managerial processes such as
decision-making [5, 8, 14]. Yet, it has also been found
that the choices and decisions made by algorithms
cannot be considered entirely free of bias [25] given that
they “reflect both the conscious and subconscious
assumptions and ideas of their creators” [16, p. 19].
Given these conflicting findings and considering that
judging the bias of an organization’s algorithm would
be beyond the scope of this paper, we focus our
theorizing on algorithmic transparency. Specifically, the
organizational justice literature contends that providing
employees with information concerning how outcomes
are determined is key to engendering perceptions of
procedural fairness and trustworthiness. Moreover, the
provision of such information also allows workers to
ascertain whether the decision-making process
represents the concerns of the groups impacted, another
criterion used to ascertain procedural fairness [9, 10, 21,
25]. Thus, we propose that:
P5: Algorithmic transparency will be positively related
to perceptions of algorithmic fairness.
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Notably, algorithmic transparency can also enable
workers to form perceptions concerning other aspects of
procedural fairness, including the presence of bias and
the consistency of decisions over people and time,
where the latter is particularly hard to discern given that
algorithms also change over time as they learn [5, 26].
4.3.2. Automatic decision-making. Within algorithmic
management
systems,
algorithms
form
and
automatically execute a range of managerial decisions
[4, 5]. While automatic decision-making processes
promote operational efficiency [5], they may also have
detrimental impacts on perceptions of fairness. As
mentioned earlier, perceptions of procedural fairness are
enhanced when decision-makers involve workers in
decisions and provide them with adequate notice before
such decisions are made. Considering that algorithmic
decision-making processes are formed and executed
automatically with minimal human intervention [4, 5],
organizational justice theory suggests that automatic
decision-making is expected to be negatively related to
perceived algorithmic fairness [21]. Nevertheless, given
that organizational justice theory was initially
conceptualized for traditional work contexts where
humans take and implement managerial decisions, to
fully understand the impact of automatic decisionmaking on perceptions of procedural fairness, we must
look to emerging work exploring the perceived fairness
of algorithmic decision-makers.
In a recent experiment comparing algorithmic and
human decision-makers across different decisions, Lee
[14] found that people’s perceptions of fairness were
impacted by decision-type. Specifically, Lee identified
two managerial decision-types: those requiring
mechanical skills (e.g., work assignment and work
scheduling) and those requiring human skills (e.g.,
hiring and work evaluation). In comparing participants’
reactions across decision-makers and decision-types,
Lee [14] found that when algorithms allocated work (a
task requiring mechanical skills), such decisions were
perceived as equally fair to human-made decisions. In
this case, participants attributed the fairness of
algorithmic decisions to their perceived efficiency and
objectivity. Conversely, when algorithms evaluated
workers (a task requiring human skills), people tended
to view such decisions as less fair than human-made
decisions due to perceptions that algorithms lack
“intuition, only measure quantifiable metrics, and
cannot evaluate social interaction or handle exceptions”
[p. 12].
Thus, in contexts where automatic decision-making
“leaves no time to discuss or revise decisions arising
from special circumstances not wholly captured by the
data” [5, p. 5], and where people perceive algorithms as
efficient, but incapable of considering the nuances of

human behavior as well as other non-quantifiable
variables, we propose that:
P6: The relationship between automatic decisionmaking and perceived algorithmic fairness will be
moderated by decision-type, such that automatic
decision-making will have a negative impact on
perceived algorithmic fairness for work evaluation
decisions (P6a) and a positive impact for work
allocation decisions (P6b).
4.3.3. Interacting with a “system”. Another key
determinant of procedural justice is the inclusion of
mechanisms, or safeguards, to correct flawed or
inaccurate decisions. Also, from a social perspective,
providing employees with a ‘voice’ (e.g., allowing for
input in the decision-making process) as well as
providing information concerning how outcomes are
determined have both been found to cultivate a strong
sense that one’s organization values one’s contribution
and cares about one’s well-being [9, 10, 21].
Per Möhlmann & Zalmanson [5], a defining
characteristic of algorithmic work environments is the
lack of human and social relationships. In particular,
gig-workers lack both an official human supervisor as
well as access to co-workers [3, 4, 5, 6, 8]. Although
gig-workers across various platforms (e.g., MTurk,
Uber, TaskRabbit) have created independent online
forums to support each other and to voice their opinions
[3, 4, 6, 8], the social interactions afforded by these
forums would have limited impact on perceptions of the
social aspects of procedural justice. Specifically,
although online forums provide a space for sensemaking
activities around algorithmic management [1, 4, 5] that
may help workers to understand and thereby ascertain
whether a platform’s decision-making algorithm is
objective, lacks bias, and/or is consistently applied,
these forums are neither supported nor promoted by
platform owners [3]. As such, any information provided
through such forums (and sensemaking activities, [6])
concerning algorithmic decisions is unlikely to be
attributed to the organization, or its concern for workers’
well-being [8]. Moreover, given that such virtual
communities are independently run, they provide no
avenues for workers to have a voice in organizational
decision-making, nor do they offer organizationallyendorsed safeguards for appealing decisions.
Considering that algorithmic management allows a
few human managers to oversee thousands of workers,
by definition, gig-workers tend to have limited avenues
to discuss issues with human supervisors [4, 5].
Specifically, given the lack of open, two-sided
communication, algorithmic management does not
allow for the questioning and discussing of algorithmic
decision-making processes and outcomes [5].
Moreover, even when workers attempt to reach
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customer service agents or managers, they are often
referred to chatbots or email correspondence mediated
via the platform [8, 17]. As a result, workers tend to
perceive that they are working for an abstract “system”,
rather than an organization composed of people [5].
Thus, we propose that:
P7: Perceptions of interacting with a “system” will be
negatively related to perceived algorithmic fairness.

5. Scholarly and Practical Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among
the first in IS to explore the impact of algorithmic
management on POS. From a scholarly standpoint, it
answers calls for technology-focused research on the
growing platform economy. According to a recent
review, though 91% of the papers surveyed consider
technology to be a critical element of the platformeconomy, most studies tend to ignore or black-box the
conceptualization of technology [18]. By adopting
Möhlmann & Zalmanson’s [5] IS-based conceptual
framework to explore how the five dimensions of
algorithmic management impact POS, we begin to
unpack the role of technology in this research stream
[18]. Importantly, our focus on algorithmic perceptions
(e.g., PAAS and PAF) is aligned with a growing stream
of work exploring how people perceive algorithms and
the mental models they form concerning how algorithms
operate, despite how they actually work [14].
By exploring the phenomenon of POS within the
context of the algorithmic management and the gigeconomy, we answer calls for research exploring the
impacts of contextual variables on POS [10], and the
impact of algorithmic management on perceptions of
justice and organizational support [8, 14]. Building on
the CASA paradigm, we suggest that, in the absence of
human interaction with organizational members (e.g.,
supervisors and peers), an organization’s algorithm is
likely to be viewed by gig-workers as both a social agent
of the organization and a manifestation of the
organization itself. Importantly, this proposition leads to
several implications for the development of POS which
can be empirically tested in the context of
algorithmically-managed platform work. Notably, a key
benefit of organizational support theory for the study of
algorithmic management is that it is a relatively mature
stream of research with well-established instruments
that are readily available for empirical testing [9].
Given that gig-organizations are still experimenting
with the technical designs and algorithms governing
their platforms, scholars from the fields of IS and
management have turned their attention to the design of
platforms in an effort to improve both the treatment of
workers and their satisfaction [3, 5, 6, 19]. From a

practical standpoint, our paper highlights the possibility
for gig-organizations to gain strategic advantage by
engendering POS through the design of their platforms
to address the universal challenges of retention and
supervision in the gig-economy. In doing so, our paper
echoes concern for the need for increased transparency
in platform algorithms and the importance of the
‘human element’ with respect to decisions pertaining to
evaluation and the provision of support [1, 5, 8, 14].
Understanding that algorithmic opacity is often an
intentional strategy to protect ‘trade secrets’ tied to
shareholder value, our theoretical development stresses
that organizations must pay careful consideration to
what aspects of the decision-making process should be
transparent vs. opaque. More specifically, platform
owners should bolster algorithmic transparency where
doing so supports workers’ autonomy. Though platform
owners may worry that increasing transparency will
enable workers to ‘game the system’, research shows
that when faced with algorithmic opacity, workers tend
to engage in sensemaking to circumvent algorithms that
curtail their autonomy [1, 4, 6, 8]. In such cases, workers
are more prone to harbor negative feelings towards the
organization and to game the system in retaliation [4].
At a high-level, increasing algorithmic transparency
could involve explaining to platform workers the goals
and intent of a managerial algorithm, as well as
articulating the “rationale for the selection, inclusion,
exclusion, or optimization of various inputs or outputs
to the algorithm” [25, p. 817]. Where disclosing
algorithms is not possible, organizations may seek to
elicit feelings of procedural fairness by submitting
themselves to routine algorithmic audits carried out by
a third-party which can provide indications that
algorithms are objective, accurate, and consistent [26].

6. Limitations & Future Research
Given the developmental nature of our paper, two
limitations in our work present opportunities for future
research. Firstly, we did not consider the impact of
workers’ personality on POS and its algorithmic
antecedents. For instance, individuals’ dispositional
tendencies to experience positive or negative affect can
“influence POS by altering whether employees interpret
organizational treatment as benevolent or malevolent”
[9, p. 701]. Secondly, we did not consider differing
extents of algorithmic management, which can impact a
worker’s agency and autonomy [18]. These limitations
present valuable future research opportunities.
The next step in our research is to empirically test
our theory. Due to the complexity of our model and the
lack of existing instrumentation for the concept of
algorithmic management (and its sub-dimensions), we
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will begin by testing P1 and P2. An online survey study
has been designed to collect data from a sample of 200
Uber drivers (an extreme case of algorithmic
management) [5]. Undertaking our survey will require
developing an instrument for our newly proposed PAAS
construct. To do so, we will conduct interviews with
Uber drivers, followed by content-validation with
experts. We hope that the next stages of our research
will provide both methodological and theoretical
contributions to the study of algorithms and POS.
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